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Middle Eastern Maelstrom,
Ardavan Amir-Aslani
Launched on February 24, 2022, the Russian offensive in Ukraine was to bring down “the cradle of Russian civilization” into the hands of the Kremlin in a few weeks. Almost a year later, Russia is still on the front line, its under-equipped army is dependent on external logistical support, and it is still grappling with Ukrainian resistance that it had not anticipated. The tone used by Vladimir Putin during his greetings speech for 2023 contrasted sharply with that used a year ago: from vindictive and warlike, it has largely given way to worried caution. Without speaking openly of a debacle, the Russian president went so far as to mention threats to the integrity and independence of Russia.
What if Putin leaves power?
Vladimir Putin knows his country well and the risks it faces. Beyond the agitation of a classic fear among nationalists, that of collapse, he already knows that the implications of a military failure of Russia in Ukraine will go far beyond a territorial retreat and a human disaster. A total defeat against kyiv could indeed be the prelude to a second disintegration of Russia, thirty years after that of the USSR.
“How not to anticipate the possibility of an implosion of the Russian Federation, under the double effect of a military failure and a particularly degraded domestic situation?”
This hypothesis remains for the time being excluded from the geopolitical projections for the year which opens, whereas it deserves the greatest attention. How, indeed, not to anticipate the possibility of an implosion of the Russian Federation, under the double effect of a military failure and a particularly degraded domestic situation?
The first consequence would be political. The eventual departure of Vladimir Putin from the Kremlin would open a period of instability and a merciless struggle for power between the ultra-nationalists, the oligarchs who have an interest in preserving the current system, and possibly reforming democratic forces. Occupied with this internal struggle and an economy under sanctions, the regime will easily fall prey to growing social unrest. In a context of weakening of the Russian central power, the demand for increased autonomy, even the risk of secession of certain republics of the Federation, in particular those of the Caucasus or distant Siberia, will also be plausible.
The peculiarities of Russia conducive to its disintegration
Considering its territorial and ethnic specificities, the risk of a new disintegration of the Russian space is a theory regularly evoked by the specialists of Russia for already a few years. Spanning eleven time zones, stretching from Eastern Europe to the Siberian Far East, present-day Russia is the product of centuries of imperial conquest and deep and multiple inequalities. Under the tsars as under the Soviet regime, only a strong and hyper-centralized power was able to hold this vast geographical and cultural ensemble. But a strong power often hides a structurally weak state.
“A strong power often hides a structurally weak state. The war in Ukraine has exposed the reality of a Russian state “Potemkin”
The war in Ukraine, which failed to live up to its promise of being a blitzkrieg, brought to light the reality of a Russian “Potemkin” state: an undiversified and poorly managed oil rent economy, corruption that affects all levels of society, unresolved social, ethnic and territorial divisions. Even if the current regime continues for some time, whether under Putin or with an unknown successor, the extreme fragility of Russian institutions will not allow it to resist for long the consequences of a military stalemate and a triple political, economic and social. The end, already predicted in the last days of the USSR, of a hypercentralization of power and a break-up of the Russian Federation, is therefore probable.
The probable chaos in Eurasia scrutinized closely by neighbors and the West
The second consequence of such an eventuality is then geopolitical, since it will induce an upheaval in the balances in Eurasia. Among the most pessimistic analysts, a context of multiple civil wars between the central power and the breakaway republics, as well as between the republics themselves on border and economic issues, is to be expected. Such chaos engendered on such a vast territory could thus make Russia the new theater for the expression of rivalries between powers. China of course will be the first to want to take advantage of this strategic vacuum which would allow it to extend its influence in Central Asia. But other powers neighboring Russia’s “near abroad” would also gain from this weakening, notably the Turkey and Iran.
“In Eurasia, a context of multiple civil wars between the central power and the breakaway republics, as well as between the republics themselves over border and economic issues, is to be expected”
For the West, it is therefore urgent to take note of the undeniable: after twenty years of a “reign” which has weakened it and made it even more unstable, Putin has most certainly condemned his country by committing it to Ukraine . Special priority and attention must therefore be given to the immediate neighbors of the Russian border, from the Baltic States to those of Central Asia, whose stability must absolutely be preserved in order to “contain” the chaos coming from Russia. These States will also have a role to play in stabilizing their new neighbors from the former Federation who have become independent.
A bad for a good ?
Without disregarding their own internal weaknesses and a particular context, empires often fall following military disasters. The combination of a war with an uncertain outcome and an economic and social crisis does not generally register the States in the long term, and this could be true for Putin’s Russia. However, this development would not necessarily be catastrophic. Notwithstanding the Russian president’s view on the matter, the collapse of the USSR in 1991 allowed the states of Eastern Europe to achieve independence and democracy relatively peacefully. Russia itself experienced a semblance of democratic life during the 1990s, which unfortunately did not materialize in the long run. From chaos can also be born renewal. From the Russian collapse could thus be born a new map of Eurasia, bringing new opportunities for its peoples.